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Abstract
The rapid growth of trust funds at multilateral development organizations
has been widely neglected in the academic literature so far. This paper ex-
amines the choice by sovereign donors among various trust fund options. It
contends that the choice among the different trust funds involves a fundamen-
tal trade-off: larger funds provide donors with “burden-sharing” benefits, but
each donor can better assert its individual preferences in a fund with fewer
other donors. The theoretical considerations yield testable hypotheses on a
range of factors affecting this fundamental trade-off, most notably the area
of intervention of the trust fund and competing domestic interests of donor
countries. A large-N analysis of participation decisions of OECD/DAC donors
in trust funds over the past decade mostly corroborates these hypotheses. In
particular, ex-ante preference alignment among donors as well as indicators
for global activities and fragile states aid are robust determinants of partic-
ipation in (large) multi-donor funds. In contrast, a donor tends to prefer a
single-donor fund in areas in which its national interests dominate.
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When a state wants to cooperate with other states, it faces a choice among a variety
of international organizations through which it can do so. In deciding to join an
international organization, an important variable is the number of member countries.
For example, everything else equal, a higher number of member states exacerbates
the collective-action problem among states.1 In the field of development assistance,
a higher number of donors implies that burden-sharing benefits for each donor are
larger but the costs for each donor in terms of its loss of control are also higher.
While this mechanism may plausibly govern the institutional choices by individ-
ual donor countries, it is extremely hard to test. In this paper, we are able to do so
by exploiting a relatively new development in the multilateral development system.
Over the past decade, donor governments have increasingly channeled their foreign
aid through “trust funds,” earmarked for particular activities. These trust funds are
ad-hoc international institutions that support specific development issues and that
rely on the implementing capacities of the international development organization
that hosts them. A prominent example is the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund. It is hosted by the World Bank, but the World Bank must keep the trust
fund contributions apart from its own assets and cannot use them for other purposes
related to its mandate. The World Bank is the most important trustee organization,
followed by the United Nations.2 Since the turn of the millennium, trust funds at
international development organizations have grown massively. With a volume of
19 billion USD in 2012, they represent about 20% of bilateral aid and almost 60% of
1 Buchanan 1965; Olson 1965; Hardin 1982.
2 A trustee does not need to implement the contributions received through trust fund ar-
rangements but may only provide fiduciary services. In this broad sense, the World Bank, which
manages the accounts of its own funds and most legally independent global funds, manages the
largest portfolio of trust funds. When considering only trust funds for which the host organization
also implements the programs, the United Nations entities’ portfolios collectively are larger than
the World Bank’s (see Section 2).
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3 At the World Bank, annual trust fund contributions quadrupled
in less than a decade from their levels in the late 1990s.4 Currently, the World Bank
receives annual contributions of about USD 4 billion that support its own programs.
In addition, the World Bank further holds about USD 10 billion in trust for which it
only provides fiduciary services.5 The sheer number of different funds is even more
striking: the World Bank Group manages over 1,000 funds. Most importantly, these
trust funds differ in their size in terms of the number of donors, ranging from single-
donor trust funds to multi-donor trust funds that in some cases comprise almost
the entire membership of the host organization. These trust funds therefore cover a
whole range of new institutional options for donor activities, ranging from perfect
substitutes for traditional bilateral aid to perfect substitutes for multilateral aid, in
terms of the number of donors.
In this paper, we study the determinants of individual donor choices among
different-sized trust funds. Using a simple theoretical model, we posit that a given
donor faces a trade-off between the greater burden-sharing benefits of funds with
more donors and the greater ability to assert its own preferences in funds with fewer
donors. Hence, the number of donors within a fund represents a key variable in our
model: synergies from cooperation with other donors increase when there are more
of them, but any given donor must compromise more on the specific objectives of
the fund, e.g. with respect to regions, countries, sectors, or themes. Other things
equal, in an issue area with low alignment of interests, cooperation with many other
donors will be less attractive than a fund with fewer donors. Conversely, a fund with
many other donors will be more attractive when “burden sharing” is an important
motive, e.g. in high-risk areas such as assistance to fragile or post-conflict countries.
Using a dataset of trust fund participation decisions of donor countries at the
3 Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Eichenauer 2015.
4 IEG 2011.
5 World Bank 2013a.
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able implications of our theory. Using Wald tests in seemingly unrelated regression
estimations to compare the effect of fund and donor characteristics on the partic-
ipation decisions in single-donor, multi-donor, and large multi-donor trust funds,
we find consistent support for our main hypotheses. We find that ex-ante sector
alignment among all donors, as well as indicators for global activities and fragile
states assistance, increase a donor’s willingness to opt for (large) multi-donor trust
funds. In contrast, a donor prefers single-donor trust funds when and where its
national interests tend to predominate. This evidence also puts into perspective the
common wisdom that trust funds first and foremost are a means to enhance donor
coordination and to reduce donor fragmentation.6 In contrast, our paper suggests
that donors can reap the benefits of aid harmonization through trust funds only
when their preferences are relatively aligned.
Our argument is not entirely novel but combines key elements of existing ap-
proaches to international cooperation. Some aid allocation studies argue that the
choice between bilateral aid and multilateral aid hinges on how a given donor trades
off potential burden-sharing benefits versus its desire for control.7 Our paper goes
beyond the discrete choice between these two channels of aid allocation and studies
the entire range of intermediate choices available to a donor through participation
in trust funds. Another novel aspect of our study is its analysis of the implications
for burden-sharing benefits and loss of control as the number of donor partners in
an international organization increases. In addition, recent research has examined
allocations of individual donors among existing international development organi-
zations based on the similarities in the allocations of these organizations with the
bilateral portfolios of the donors and the efficiency differences of the organizations.8
6 Guder 2009; Barakat, Rzeszut, and Martin 2012; Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Eichenauer
2015.
7 Milner and Tingley 2013.
8 Schneider and Tobin 2016.
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nization. We also do not consider a given set of organizations but allow for the
possibility that a donor creates an ad-hoc international institution (specifically, in
the form of a trust fund) on its own or in partnership with other donors. This is a
new feature of the flexible instrument of trust funds that has not been considered
in the previous literature. Finally, as part of this research we conducted more than
80 staff interviews at the World Bank, which inform our theoretical discussion and
provide qualitative evidence to complement our data analysis.
Our theory has implications for institutional design beyond trust funds. On the
one hand, we expect a similar trade-off to govern the choice of a given country to join
a specific set of international organizations. On the other hand, we emphasize the
novelty of trust funds as a design solution for global issues that warrant flexible forms
of cooperation among states. In contrast to full-fledged international development
organizations, trust funds are ad-hoc institutions that are easy to establish but that
are also readily terminated when deemed appropriate by the donors. While interna-
tional development organizations are typically seen as the most efficient solution to
resolve burgeoning development challenges, our evidence suggests that alternative
institutional solutions that convene a coalition of states may be more efficient, de-
pending on the preference constellation of all states. In some cases, trust funds may
even be the only feasible solution to address new development challenges, notably
when there is stalemate in the formal governing bodies of the established interna-
tional organizations. Accordingly, donors emphasize that they use trust funds to
“fill gaps in the multilateral system,” e.g., assisting fragile states, supplying global
public goods, and tackling humanitarian emergencies.9
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, after clarifying relevant terms, we first
present the historical evolution of trust funds using the example of the World Bank.
9 IEG 2011: 6.
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types of trust funds at the Bank. In Section 3, we review the related literature that
will inform our subsequent theoretical argument on the determinants of trust fund
choice. Section 4 presents our argument and derives concrete testable hypotheses
related to donor choices of different types of trust funds. Section 5 reports findings
from the econometric analysis. Section 6 provides a summary and conclusions.
2 Historical developments of trust funds
Trust funds represent the main instrument for bilateral donors to channel multi-bi
aid to international development organizations. Multi-bi aid refers to earmarked
contributions by donor countries to international development organizations to sup-
port specific development purposes, notably specific themes, sectors, or countries.10
From a recipient-country perspective, trust funds provide grant resources and thus
are most comparable to the established grant-making facilities of multilateral agen-
cies.11 In most agencies, trust funds can be established between the donor(s) and
the agency without approval of the formal governing bodies.12 Fund administration
is governed by an agreement between the bilateral donor(s) and the agency, which
provides trustee services and administers the related programs.13 The agreement
covers not only the substantive program priorities supported by the fund but also
determines the conditions of program delivery. Despite much flexibility in such an
agreement, international procurement rules also apply to the programs supported
through trust funds. In particular, this usually prevents donors from directly tying
their contributions to domestic purchases.14
10 OECD 2011: 28.
11 Grant-making facilities include all United Nations agencies and the concessional windows of
the multilateral development banks.
12 World Bank 2012a: 27.
13 Bantekas 2009; Droesse 2011; McKeehan 2012.
14 The only exception to this general rule is a consultant trust fund, in which a donor may use
its own staff to perform an analytical task. In 2004 the World Bank announced it would no longer
8
      ¡ ¢  £¤¡ ¥¢ ¦
TheWorld Bank has long-standing experience with trust funds dating to the 1960s.15
Its first trust fund was established in 1960, when several donors jointly created a
trust fund to co-finance the Indus Basin Project in Pakistan. Also in the 1960s, the
World Bank agreed to execute technical assistance projects of the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP). Until the late 1990s, trust funds grew only very
slowly and mostly were a vehicle for the Bank to participate in partnership pro-
grams, for example the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
(CGIAR) in the 1970s. In the mid-1980s, donors also started to use consultant trust
funds to support the analytical work of the Bank and to provide technical assistance
to recipient countries. An important fund established in 1987 was the Policy and Hu-
man Resource Development program (PHRD), which financed project preparation
activities.16
The early 1990s witnessed the first sizable trust fund that was a collective
makeshift for donors confronted with policy stalemate in the formal governing body.
When the United States withheld its IDA contribution to pressure for reforms at
the World Bank, other donors created an interim trust fund to cover the costs of
some World Bank programs.17
Since the late 1990s, trust funds were discovered by donors frustrated with their
own limited possibilities to influence World Bank policies, and by the Bank’s slug-
gishness in addressing emergent issues they deemed important. For example, Japan
sought to establish an ideological counterpart to the United States by establishing
its own trust fund with the World Bank.18 In addition, some middle powers such
accept consultant trust funds.
15 Technically speaking, the International Development Association (IDA), created in 1960, was
the first trust fund. Given its broad mandate and its nearly universal membership, it is not
considered to be a trust fund in the common sense that refers to earmarked funding for special
purposes.
16 World Bank 2005: 1.
17 USGAO 1995: 20; Thibodeau 1996; Weaver 2008: 54.
18 Weaver 2007: 500.
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nomic wealth than the United States” and bypassed the formal budgetary process,
providing supplementary trust fund resources in exchange for policy influence.19
Examples of such influence-seeking trust funds include the Japanese Social Develop-
ment Fund (JSDF), which complemented Bank-financed operations by small-scale
activities with local non-governmental actors,20 the Bank-Netherlands Partnership
Program (BNPP), which supported pilot studies to help the Bank identify “where
most development impacts could be expected,”21 the Governance Partnership Facil-
ity (GPF), funded by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Norway (Australia
joined later),22 and trust funds to alleviate post-conflict reconstruction needs, for
example in Bosnia and Herzegovina.23
In some cases, the Bank has encouraged donors to channel their development
assistance through trust funds. A well-documented case of “mission creep” initiated
from inside the Bank is climate change. Expecting a honey pot, the Bank expanded
into carbon finance, despite reservations in the Board of Executive Directors and by
the United States. In 1996, it launched a pilot fund, backed by Bank president James
Wolfensohn, and institutionalized its new role by establishing the Carbon Finance
Group in the department for sustainable development in 2003. Subsequently, trust
funds related to climate change have proliferated.24
While formally rejected by many member states, the climate activities of the
World Bank were supported by some OECD/DAC donors.25 Similarly, OECD/DAC
donors pushing a “good governance” agenda over the opposition of many recipient
19 Kapur 2002: 63.
20 World Bank 2012b: 32.
21 BNPP 2013: 2.
22 World Bank 2012b: 133.
23 Mallaby 2004.
24 Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2011: 262-263.
25 Opposition against making the World Bank formally work on climate change issues primar-
ily comes from developing countries, which have less influence at the World Bank than in more
egalitarian international institutions (Mu¨ller and Winkler 2008).
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the principle of enhancing recipient-country ownership, but also to some extent
with the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, which prohibit it from interfering in coun-
tries’ political affairs.26 By operating via trust funds, OECD/DAC donors could
avoid lengthy discussions and costly concessions in the Board of Governors to build
consensus on the necessary legal adaptations to make the Bank work on political
governance issues.
In the 2000s, the World Bank further expanded its role in trust funds. In tandem
with its explosion in IBRD/IDA trust funds, the Bank also positioned itself as
a trustworthy partner for “multi-actor funds”27 – legally independent multilateral
institutions that mobilize donor resources and pass them on to multilateral agencies
for implementation.28 In these partnerships, supported by “financial intermediary
funds” (FIFs), the Bank only provides limited fiduciary services. In essence, while
donors did not perceive the World Bank and many other United Nations entities
as “fit for purpose” to address global challenges,29 for example HIV/AIDS,30 they
charged the Bank with the financial accounting for multi-actor funds. This helped
the Bank become involved in global issues and hence build up the relevant expertise
to position itself against competition.31 There are only 20 FIF programs, but these
programs are sizable and account for almost two-thirds of total trust fund portfolio
assets.32
The historical evolution of trust funds at the World Bank is reflected in its
current portfolio. Mirroring the crucial role of trust funds in assisting post-conflict
26 Mallaby 2004: 180; Weaver 2008: 93; Weaver 2008: 116.
27 Heimans 2004.
28 Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Eichenauer 2015: 530.
29 E.g., Held and McGrew 2003; Woods 2005; IEG 2011.
30 Mallaby 2004: 329.
31 IEG 2011: 65-69.
32 See World Bank 2014a. In 2012, the average contribution to a financial intermediary fund
was USD 12 million; the comparable figure for both single-donor trust funds and multi-donor trust
funds with fewer than five donors was USD 3 million (World Bank 2014a and 2014b).
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Sudan are among the top 10 recipients in terms of the overall number of trust fund
contributions between FY 2002-13 (Figure 1). Post-conflict needs may also play a
role in Serbia, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone, which follow suit in the top 25 list.33
[Figure 1 here]
Most trust funds are not designed to support specific countries. An analysis
of the historical record of trust fund contributions from FY 2002-13 – the longest
time span for which systematic information on trust fund contributions is available
– shows that less than 30% of all trust funds were earmarked for a specific country
at the time of agreement. Conversely, almost 60% of the funds are of global scope,
while the remainder supports (inter-) regional activities. However, almost all trust
funds support dedicated themes or sectors,34 reflecting the fact that many trust
funds were initiated by individual donors pushing for their most salient sectoral or
thematic interests.
Following our description of the historical trends in trust funds at the World
Bank, we focus on the participation patterns of individual OECD/DAC donors.
OECD/DAC donors provide the bulk of contributions, and account for 90% of
all participation decisions. About 300 other donors, including multilateral donors,
donor countries, and private foundations, share the remainder.35
2.2 Donor participation decisions
In the following, we present some descriptive statistics on donor participation de-
cisions in World Bank trust funds based on contributions data in the trust fund
databases.36 First of all, we consider the average participation in any type of trust
33 From a Bank perspective, trust funds are a useful tool to engage in these countries because
many of them either are not eligible for IBRD/IDA resources or it would be too risky for the Bank
to invest its own assets (Interview with Adviser from a Central Unit, July 15, 2013).
34 World Bank 2014a.
35 World Bank 2014b.
36 World Bank 2014b.
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dom are by far the most active users of trust funds at the World Bank. Australia,
Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland are the other donors with a
significantly higher than average propensity to use trust funds. Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, and the United States are just below, but very close to the DAC
average. The group of countries with a propensity significantly below the DAC av-
erage comprises the southern European member states (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and
Spain), other small donors (Austria, Belgium, Iceland, New Zealand) and the two
Asian donors (Japan and South Korea).
[Figure 2 here]
In terms of the total number of trust funds to which a donor contributed be-
tween FY 2002-13, the United Kingdom (450 contributions), the Netherlands (400
contributions), and Sweden (280 contributions) are the top three donors. In cumu-
lative terms, the largest contributions between FY 2002-13 were made by the United
Kingdom (USD 15 billion), the United States (USD 14 billion), and Japan (USD
8 billion). The United Kingdom has also undergone the most dynamic evolution,
growing from a mid-sized to the largest trust fund donor in less than a decade.
We also examine the distribution of the number of donors that join together in a
trust fund. This distribution tends to follow a power law: almost half of trust funds
are supported by a single donor, while trust funds with two, three or four donors
each occur at a frequency of about 8%, and trust funds with more than 4 donors at
a frequency of below 5%. These frequencies further decline for increasing fund sizes.
However, there also are some funds in which all DAC donors are members. The
empirical distribution of fund sizes suggests a simple categorization of trust funds
that forms the backbone of our subsequent analysis. In particular, we distinguish
among single-donor trust funds (SDTFs), small multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs)
(up to 4 donors), and large MDTFs (5 donors or more). The cut-off between small
and large MDTFs is somewhat arbitrary, but corresponds to the discussion in the
13
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Figure 3 differentiates between the propensity of donors to join these three
types of funds. Donors with above-average propensity to create SDTFs include
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, Switzerland, Australia,
and the United States. For small MDTFs, several donors are significantly above
the average, including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland,
Sweden, Denmark, and Australia. Particularly noteworthy is the low participation
of the United States in these types of funds, even more so given its above-average
use of SDTFs. For large MDTFs, the picture looks similar, with the United King-
dom, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Canada being significantly
above the average donor in their participation rates.
[Figure 3 here]
In general, the donor countries with more SDTFs also participate more frequently
in MDTFs. Similarly, most donors with little or no participation in SDTFs are even
further below average in their propensity to join MDTFs. Essentially, this implies
that they hardly engage in trust funds at all. In contrast, some countries participate
in nearly all multi-donor initiatives, which cannot easily be seen from the plotted
probability in Figure 3. For example, the United Kingdom participates in almost
half of all small MDTFs. There is no strong correlation between choice of trust fund
type and overall donor size. Relatively large donors such as the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, and the United States have the capacity to “go it alone,” but smaller
donors such as Austria, Ireland, and Switzerland also have a tendency to use SDTFs
– perhaps hinting at isolated policy preferences.
The different participation patterns across DAC donors as well as the use of
different funds warrant an explanation. In the following, we seek to leverage related
literature for developing our theoretical argument to account for these empirical
patterns.
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Few academic studies explicitly address multi-bi aid. Only recently have scholars
begun to analyze multi-bi aid more systematically, and some of the work cited be-
low is not yet published. Erin Graham traces the growing bilateralization of the
United Nations development system. Her article raises concerns that multi-bi fund-
ing undermines universal multilateralism.37 In another article, Graham illustrates
that variation in donor preferences over both the size and the substance of agency
activity can explain macro-historical shifts in funding rules from core funding to (un-
earmarked) voluntary funding and earmarked funding at international organizations
since the Second World War.38 Devi Sridhar and Ngaire Woods examine the specific
case of the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and suggest that
donors channel resources through the Global Fund to influence the activities of the
World Health Organization, a practice they term “Trojan multilateralism.”39
A broader analysis of multi-bi aid across all institutions has become possible only
recently with a new multi-bi aid dataset.40 The new data allow tracking the evolu-
tion of multi-bi aid after the Cold War and informing the debate on its underlying
motives and related implications for aid effectiveness.41 In fact, multi-bi financ-
ing may have tangible implications for international development organizations in
terms of distorting program priorities, rivalry with core resources, and funding sus-
tainability.42 From a theoretical perspective, the combination of donor preferences,
discretion granted to the multilateral organization, and voting rules influence al-
location decisions among bilateral aid, unearmarked voluntary contributions, and
earmarked funding.43 Other work shows that earmarked funding relates to the in-
37 Graham 2015.
38 Graham 2016.
39 Sridhar and Woods 2013.
40 See Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2016). For the codebook, see Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2014).
41 Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Eichenauer 2015; Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2016.
42 Reinsberg 2016.
43 Eichenauer and Hug 2015.
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for the European Union institutions.44 Further ongoing work studies the country
allocations of trust funds in comparison to core-funded operations45 These studies
illustrate that trust funds are used for various purposes and that the effectiveness of
trust funds hinges upon their funding purposes and underlying motivations. How-
ever, none of these studies explicitly address the variety of choices within multi-bi
aid, and the key question of how donors decide among these alternatives.
Based primarily on donors’ own arguments regarding this new phenomenon, some
of the literature is also based on faulty assumptions which can lead to erroneous con-
clusions.46 In particular, the neglect of SDTFs tends to perpetuate the conventional
wisdom that donors primarily use trust funds as a means to enhance aid coordina-
tion. In fact, many studies argue that multi-bi aid allows bilateral donors to pool
their resources and thereby achieve key principles of the Paris Declaration,47 includ-
ing recipient-country ownership, aid harmonization, and mutual accountability,48
although success is sometimes difficult to achieve.49
In contrast, other studies emphasize that multi-bi aid gives an individual donor
nearly as much control as bilateral aid, but without requiring the donor to sustain a
full-fledged aid bureaucracy, while still benefiting from the expertise and profession-
alism of multilaterals.50 This view suggests that multi-bi aid is popular with donors
because it combines the “best of two worlds.” But this perspective overlooks the
variety of choices within multi-bi aid. Our argument is that there is a trade-off in
44 Michaelowa, Reinsberg, and Schneider 2016.
45 Eichenauer and Knack 2016.
46 See Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Eichenauer, who review the related literature.
47 For details on the Paris Declaration and the related Accra Agenda for Ac-
tion, see http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm
(accessed February 1, 2015).
48 Barakat 2009; Guder 2009; OECD 2011.
49 Barakat, Rzeszut, and Martin 2012. This ambivalence on the potential purpose of trust funds
– “bilateralization of multilateral aid” and “multilateralization of bilateral aid” – also features in
other policy studies (Mahn 2012; Browne and Weiss 2014).
50 Carlsson 2007: 63; IEG 2011: 6; OECD 2011: 28; Tortora and Steensen 2014: 15.
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optimal combination between the two extremes, on a case-by-case basis for specific
topics and under the varying political and economic conditions in the donor country
itself.
To analyze the choice among different types of trust funds, we draw on three
related, more general strands of the literature on international organization and
adapt their insights to our research questions.
The first strand concerns the rational design of international institutions that
can be used to explain the associated institutional choices from a donor perspec-
tive. In general, the rational design literature relates specific institutional design
choices of inter-state cooperation to the potential conflicts over the distribution of
the gains from cooperation, the existence of an enforcement problem, the number
of relevant actors in the field, and issue characteristics such as the distribution of
state preferences, uncertainty, transaction costs, and group characteristics.51 States
may also design whole ensembles of institutions, an issue studied by the literature
on international regime proliferation.52
The rational design literature is relevant for our purpose because it can explain
the establishment of trust funds. While we will analyze donor participation deci-
sions rather than decisions about the establishment of new funds, in the case of
trust funds these decisions are generally identical. Trust funds hosted at interna-
tional development organizations are temporary mechanisms, often created in an
ad-hoc manner and with a donor base that usually changes little, if at all, over the
lifetime of the fund. These characteristics distinguish trust funds from more sustain-
able institutional choices – such as legally independent multilateral organizations –
although a small percentage of trust funds evolve into independent multilaterals.
51 Martin 1992; Abbott and Snidal 1998; Abbott and Snidal 2000; Koremenos, Lipson, and
Snidal 2001; Gutner 2005; Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal 2013.
52 Raustiala and Victor 2004; Forman and Segaar 2006; Alter and Meunier 2009; Biermann,
Pattberg, van Asselt, and Zelli 2009; Morse and Keohane 2014.
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trust funds. Julia Gray raises the issue of “zombie organizations” that endure despite
generating no significant outputs.53 For donor countries that are averse to zombies,
trust funds are a useful institutional mechanism because they do not face problems
in attracting qualified staff, while being relatively easy to dismantle once they have
served their purpose.54 Tana Johnson notes that states are not alone in establishing
international organizations, but that international bureaucrats shape the design of
“organizational progeny.”55 Bureaucrats have an incentive to enter the design stage
as they see an opportunity to design greater insulation from member states. In
most cases, notably when states lack relevant expertise and when their stakes are
not too high, states willingly cede some autonomy to bureaucrats as a means of
incentivizing them to contribute their expertise.56 To the degree that trust funds can
be conceived as “organizational progeny” emanating from international development
organizations, our paper also relates to this novel strand of the institutional design
literature.
The second strand of literature examines how donors allocate their aid budgets.
This vast literature dates to the 1970s and establishes the general motivations for
provision of foreign aid by donors.57 A major theme of this literature distinguishes
donor interest and recipient need as primary motives. Similar motives should apply
to donors’ choice of trust funds. In particular, the specific strand of the aid allocation
literature that compares allocations of bilateral donors to those of multilateral donors
should provide analogues for our study. Just as multilaterals’ allocations appear to
53 Gray 2015
54 Interview with Director, August 9, 2013. Also see Tortora and Steensen (2014: 31) on
how “sunset clauses set a clear end date” for trust funds, reflecting the idea that they “should
be temporary financing mechanisms for specific aims,” and preventing “the growth of dormant
funds.”
55 Johnson 2014.
56 Johnson and Urpelainen 2014.
57 Early examples are, e.g., Dudley and Montmarquette 1976; McKinlay and Little 1977; Maizels
and Nissanke 1984; Frey and Schneider 1986.
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58 we should expect larger
MDTFs to reflect development objectives more than small MDTFs or SDTFs that
can be used as alternatives to bilateral aid in pursuing geopolitical or commercial
interests.
The third strand of literature deals with regime choices between bilateralism and
multilateralism.59 We focus on the set of studies that more narrowly analyze the
choice between alternative existing aid channels.60 Two studies by Helen Milner and
Dustin Tingley, and Christina Schneider and Jennifer Tobin, are most related to our
work and will therefore be discussed in more detail.
In the Milner-Tingley study, donors choose between bilateral aid and multilateral
aid and thereby trade off the burden-sharing benefits against the loss of control from
delegating to multilaterals. If donors find their preferences to be aligned with the
priorities of multilateral agencies, the greater benefits of burden-sharing through
multilateral aid can make it the preferred choice. Conversely, if preferences are
poorly aligned, donors are more likely to prefer bilateral aid than to give up control to
a multilateral. In contrast to their model, a donor in our model considers preference
alignment with other donors on an issue that may be the subject of a trust fund,
rather than alignment of its preferences with those of a multilateral agency. In the
new and flexible world of trust funds, alignment with existing agencies becomes less
relevant as a new institution can be quickly established responding to the preferences
of its contributors.
Schneider and Tobin study donors’ contributions to different multilateral agen-
cies. When choosing among multilateral institutions, donors trade off policy compat-
ibility against risk aversion. Benefits from delegation increase when aid is channeled
through multilaterals with policies that best match the bilateral’s own preferences,
58 See, e.g., Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Headey 2008; Birdsall, Kharas, Mahgoub, and Perakis
2010; Knack, Rogers, and Eubank 2011.
59 Rixen and Rohlfing 2007; Thompson and Verdier 2013.
60 E.g., Bermeo 2008; Dietrich 2013; Milner and Tingley 2013; Schneider and Tobin 2016.
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tions incurs excessive risk, such that the donor prefers to diversify its contributions
among more multilaterals. Excessive risk in this context refers to the possibility
of sudden changes in a multilateral’s policies, or in its efficiency. This theoretical
approach has the advantage of providing an argument as to why the typical donor
spreads its funding over numerous multilateral agencies.
In our study, we ensure the existence of intermediate choices (regarding the
number of participating donors in a trust fund) by assuming that as the number of
donors to a fund increases, other things equal, preference homogeneity among them
declines, while the burden-sharing benefits increase. Hence, the donor’s utility from
participating in a trust fund on a given issue can increase with the number of other
donors up to a point but then decrease. The optimal number of partners in the fund
will often be greater than zero but less than the number of donors contributing to
a multilateral such as IDA. In contrast, the donor’s decision in Milner and Tingley
is dichotomous: it will choose either bilateral or multilateral aid.
4 Theory and hypotheses
4.1 Theoretical argument
We posit that each sovereign donor first takes a decision about (core) multilateral
aid (often fixed through long-term international commitments) and about (pure) bi-
lateral aid, i.e., aid implemented directly by bilateral agencies or their partners such
as local non-governmental organizations. Once this decision is taken, the remaining
aid budget is allocated to multi-bi aid. As highlighted by the ellipsis in Figure 4,
this allocation process is our focus. The question whether and under which condi-
tions multi-bi aid is preferred to bi- or multilateral aid in the first place is equally
interesting, but its analysis requires a different data structure, based on disburse-
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61 Moreover, even when
focusing on the options within multi-bi aid alone, we can basically cover the full
range of options. This is because at the extremes, multi-bi aid offers (almost) per-
fect substitutes to traditional bilateral, and traditional multilateral aid respectively.
Therefore, we do not lose much by excluding these traditional aid flows from our
analysis. Concentrating on the choice between different types of multi-bi aid, we
develop our argument verbally in this section but refer readers to the Supplemental
Appendix for a formal presentation.
[Figure 4 here]
Multi-bi aid can be allocated to trust funds of different sizes, varying from SDTFs
to large MDTFs. For illustrative purposes, we consider the choice between three
types, namely SDTFs, small MDTFs (with two to four donors), and large MDTFs
(with five or more donors).
When choosing in which trust funds to participate, a donor considers the utility
that it could gain from participating in each possible fund. Assuming that each donor
faces a budget constraint that allows for participation in only a limited number of
funds, the donor chooses to engage in those funds that provide the highest utility.
The role of the budget constraint is to ensure that not every donor is a member of
every fund, provided that the utility from joining any fund is generally positive.
To unpack the utility function, we posit that any individual donor cares about
both efficiency of resource use and the maintenance of control in its delivery of foreign
aid. In this regard, the overall number of participating donors plays a critical role.
By cooperating with other donors, a donor can achieve efficiency gains, for instance
due to synergies, economies of scale, risk sharing opportunities, or the prospect
61 Papers examining donor choices between aid channels are, e.g., Eichenauer and Reinsberg
(2016) and Eichenauer and Hug (2015). These papers, however, cannot take into account the large
variation among trust funds, which we believe is a crucial feature to understand donor decision-
making. We return to some data-related challenges to estimating the full decision tree in the
empirical section.
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Tingley, we refer to these advantages from cooperation more generally as “burden-
sharing” benefits. These burden-sharing benefits to a donor from participating in
a fund increase with the number of other donors to the fund. However, any given
donor will also have to compromise more on the priority objectives of the fund,
as the number of other donors increases. Large divergences in preferences among
donors reduce the utility of individual participation by lowering the degree of control
for each donor. With greater preference heterogeneity, transaction costs associated
with finding a consensus will increase, and the congruence between that consensus
and each donor’s own objectives will be reduced.
Our argument that a donor considers the potential for burden-sharing with other
donors and the extent of preference homogeneity is supported by our interviews.62
For example, an Executive Director from a small donor country said: “Multi-donor
trust funds are a vehicle to help in areas where we would have no pathway to
do anything and where we can expect more impact from our tiny contribution.”63
Another Executive Director, from a large donor country, said that global funds
would be a useful mechanism to “catalyze aid from other donors [...].”64 Donors
also emphasized that sometimes there might be only a limited subset of donors with
similar preferences, leading to small-n funds rather than large-n funds. For example,
one Executive Director from a Nordic donor country explained that “[w]e give core
funds wherever possible, but we also go into basket funding with other progressive,
like-minded donors,”65 while yet another donor representative observed that “[t]here
is always a tension between efficiency [...] and bilateral interests.”66
62 Our study benefits from more than 80 interviews, conducted with World Bank staff members
and Executive Directors in Washington D.C. from 07/16/2013 to 08/29/2013. Further details are
available from the authors on request.
63 Interview with Executive Director, August 27, 2013.
64 Interview with Executive Director, August 20, 2013.
65 Interview with Executive Director, August 6, 2013.
66 Interview with Executive Director, August 19, 2013.
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of other donors participating in a fund. Because the former decreases while the latter
increases with the number of other donors, the utility of participation first increases
and later decreases in the number of other donors. The optimal number of partners
in a fund can be between zero and the universe of all donors.
We are not able to measure directly preference homogeneity and burden-sharing
benefits in a systematic way for a large sample of trust fund decisions. Our empiri-
cal tests instead rely on issue-area and donor-country characteristics that plausibly
reflect variation in preference homogeneity and/or burden-sharing benefits. In the
next section we generate testable implications about how these characteristics should
influence donors’ choices among SDTFs, small MDTFs and large MDTFs, based on
arguments about how these characteristics affect the considerations for preference
homogeneity and burden-sharing benefits.
4.2 Hypotheses and operationalization
Although the trade-off between burden sharing and preference homogeneity is not
directly testable, we can exploit variation in sector and donor characteristics that
are plausibly associated with it. As these characteristics are measurable, we are
able to assess the usefulness of our model in explaining when donors choose small,
mid-sized, or large trust funds.
In the following, we formulate six testable hypotheses regarding donor’s choice
of trust fund size types (SDTFs, small MDTFs and large MDTFs). Note that
the sectoral and donor-specific characteristics on which these arguments focus are
certainly not the only ones that could influence the balance between preference
homogeneity and burden sharing. Our choice of appropriate variables is restricted
by the availability of adequate indicators at the trust-fund level. However, we believe
that our set of variables is comprehensive enough to demonstrate the mechanisms
at work if donors in fact trade off between preference homogeneity and burden
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general sectoral preferences, the state of their economies, recipients’ income levels,
and the thematic orientation of the trust fund towards fragile states, global public
goods, or generally, topics that have made it onto the agenda of restrictive clubs of
industrialized countries (i.e., G8). In the following, we will discuss one by one how
these variables are expected to influence the balance between preference homogeneity
and burden-sharing, and the related choice of the optimal trust fund size-type from
the perspective of the individual donor.
Ex-ante sector variation of donor interests
We argue that the degree to which an additional donor in the trust fund affects
preference homogeneity depends on how much ex-ante preferences are aligned. We
particularly consider preferences in development sectors, because almost all trust
funds are earmarked for activities with a particular sectoral focus, but only a minor-
ity of trust funds are earmarked for activities in specific countries (see Section 2). In
contrast to the (unmeasurable) concept of preference heterogeneity used throughout
our model, we refer to “ex-ante variation of sector focus” to denote our indicator of
heterogeneity in donor’s preferences over sectors, measured independently of their
actual participation in the various trust funds.
In some sectors, ex-ante variation in donors’ focus on the sector is higher than
in others. Where donors agree more about the importance of a sector, it is arguably
more likely they can readily agree on activities and objectives for a trust fund devoted
to that sector. In that case, adding more donors to the fund should not substantially
decrease preference homogeneity. Hence, a donor can benefit from burden-sharing
without incurring strong losses from a dilution of focus within the fund, or risking
a shift in the fund’s objectives away from its preferences. Conversely, if donors’
views on the sector’s importance are more varied, the less willing donors should be
to invest in large trust funds.
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ÝÞß In an issue area with high ex-ante variation of sector focus among the donors,
a given donor prefers to participate in small trust funds as opposed to large
trust funds.
A standard way of measuring ex-ante preference variation between donors is by
looking at differences in the shares of aid allocated to individual sectors (i.e., issue
areas) in each donor’s bilateral aid portfolio. If all donors provide a similar share of
bilateral aid to a sector, we consider that interests in this area are relatively aligned.
In contrast, a strong variation in bilateral aid shares for a given sector indicates
ex-ante variation of sector focus and should aggravate the problem of preference
heterogeneity when adding more donors to a trust fund.
Accordingly, we measure ex-ante variation of sector focus by calculating the
coefficient of variation in the sectoral shares of bilateral aid, for the sector(s) relevant
to the respective trust funds, by all donors covered in the OECD/DAC’s Creditor
Reporting System (CRS).67 Admittedly, this measure is not perfect, because for
example donors may have different ex-ante preferences over sub-sectors (such as
primary vs. secondary education) within a sector, or about specific goals (such as
enrollment vs. quality of schooling). Disagreement over sectoral priorities, however,
is likely to be correlated with the level of disagreement on some subsidiary issues,
e.g., the same donors with above-average preferences for education aid will tend
to have above-average preferences for aid for primary education. Moreover, this
method is consistent with other studies that use bilateral aid to measure and compare
individual donor preferences.68
Note that donor preferences over sectoral allocations may differ even if their aid is
motivated purely by development objectives. For ideological or other reasons, some
donors, for example, may emphasize government provision of education and health
services as the crucial path to development, while others may emphasize private
67 See OECD 2014b. For a full definition of this variable, see Table 6.
68 Lyne, Nielson, and Tierney 2009; Copelovitch 2010; Schneider and Tobin 2016.
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geopolitical or commercial reasons as well. Either explanation is consistent with
hypothesis 1.
Joint priorities in global governance
When donors have a joint interest in acting upon a common development challenge,
adding more donors can increase the burden-sharing benefits, with little or no neg-
ative impact on preference homogeneity. For instance, when a topic is discussed at
the level of the G8 and commitments are made, one can infer that the issue requires
some common action and that there is some commonality of interests among most
of the G8 member states.69
The Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) is a frequently
mentioned example of a World Bank trust fund emanating from a G8 summit.70 At
the L’Aquila summit in 2009, G8 leaders expressed their concern about hunger and
poverty caused by soaring food prices, lack of investment, and the global financial
crisis. Recognizing the “urgent need for decisive action,” they promised to “[...]
partner with vulnerable countries and regions to help them develop and implement
their own food security strategies, and together substantially increase sustained
commitments of financial and technical assistance to invest in those strategies.”71
A number of international organizations including the World Bank attended the
summit and endorsed the statement of the G8. In total, leaders pledged USD 22
billion for food security over three years. USD 800 million were ultimately committed
to GAFSP, which was established one year after the L’Aquila summit.72
This example demonstrates that issues adopted at G8 summits typically imply a
69 See also Copelovitch and Putnam (2014), who emphasize that prior agreements create an
“institutional context” that influences the terms of additional cooperation.
70 Interview with Adviser, Sustainable Development Network, World Bank (August 2, 2013).
71 G8 2009.
72 G8 2010.
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joint funding for initiatives addressing common-priority development problems.73
H2. If a given development issue has benefited from donor pledges at the previous
G8 summit, a given donor is more likely to support this issue through a multi-
donor fund rather than a single-donor trust fund.
We measure trust funds’ relevance to the G8 by donors’ rhetorical commitments at
preceding summits. Specifically, for each trust fund, we count the number of its
sectors for which pledges were made at the G8 summit in the year prior to trust
fund activation.
Financing of global public goods
The salience of donor cooperation is even more evident when it comes to addressing
global challenges such as climate change or the spread of communicable diseases.
Activities in these areas benefit all donors, so preferences will be relatively ho-
mogeneous. Moreover, a large common effort is likely to be required to produce
satisfactory results, so burden-sharing benefits will be relatively high. Hence, in the
area of global public goods, cooperation among many donors appears as the most
effective form of intervention. This leads to our next hypothesis:
H3. If a donor wishes to contribute to the supply of global public goods, it is
more likely to operate through large MDTFs instead of using small MDTFs
or SDTFs.
We use a dummy indicator variable for global activities that is based on the World
Bank’s own classification of trust fund activities.74 An activity is global if its ben-
efits do not accrue to any single recipient country. The IEG confirms that global
73 Panneels and Beringhs 2005.
74 World Bank 2014a.
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75 Hence, our
understanding is that trust funds for global activities primarily support the provision
of global public goods.
Assistance to fragile states
Risk-sharing is one aspect of burden-sharing benefits that is particularly relevant in
certain contexts, such as assistance to fragile and post-conflict states.76 When the
activities of a fund are perceived as high-risk, cooperation among multiple donors
allows the risks to be shared. In some high-profile cases such as Afghanistan, there
are risks that large-scale peace-keeping and state-building programs may fail, and
the reputational costs to a single donor responsible for such a program in the event
of failure could be prohibitive.77 In the event of a successful program, all involved
donors could share in the credit. Even in cases where a donor can be relatively con-
fident about the success of a program overall, some specific projects may fail. When
many donors contribute, the project portfolio can be larger and more diversified,
hence reducing the risk that publicity surrounding one failed project will outweigh a
larger story line of success. Moreover, it is politically useful for a donor to share the
responsibility with other donors if individual projects turn out to be problematic.
Risk sharing is particularly relevant in the context of fragile states. Assistance to
fragile and post-conflict states is also likely to be an area where donors have strong
common interests, as instability, conflict, and insecurity are problems that tend to
spill across borders. For larger fragile or post-conflict states (such as Afghanistan)
the spillover effects of conflict could be global, but even for smaller ones with re-
gional effects (e.g., the Solomon Islands) there are likely to be multiple donors with
75 IEG 2011: vii.
76 In a recent World Development Report, the World Bank writes “International engagement
in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCSs) poses considerable risks for donors and implementing
partners [...]” (World Bank 2014d: 264).
77 World Bank 2014d: 263.
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be stated as follows:
H4. In assisting fragile states, a donor is more likely to participate in multi-donor
trust funds than in single-donor trust funds.
A binary indicator variable for whether a trust fund supports fragile states can be
drawn directly from the World Bank trust fund database.78
Assistance to middle-income countries
Assistance to middle-income countries (MICs) was frequently mentioned in our in-
terviews as a key motive underlying trust funds. Grants and concessionary loans
from IDA, the IMF and regional development banks are not available to MICs, so
they may face a higher risk of running into a financing gap for their development
needs. As one Executive Director stressed: “Trust funds are really important in
MICs [...] there is consensus on that.”79 However, donors may agree on the specific
MICs to which they want to extend their assistance. Aid to MICs is a case where
donor-specific interests are likely to predominate over recipient need in the choice
of recipient countries. The promotion of donors’ commercial and geopolitical inter-
ests has been emphasized in the aid allocation literature as an important motive
for providing development assistance.80 In MICs, donors may compete for trade
access or other commercial and geopolitical objectives. Even where they do not
compete, some donors will have a stronger interest than others due to geographic
proximity or cultural, linguistic and/or historical ties. Where such interests are at
stake, donors’ preferences will tend to differ more than when their aid is responding
to recipient need. In some cases – Jordan is arguably an example – the geopolitical
78 See World Bank 2014a. Some trust funds support more than one fragile state, so this binary
indicator is more straightforward than alternative indicators of country risk, that would require
aggregating in some way and that in any event are unavailable for some fragile states.
79 Interview with Executive Director, August 19, 2013.
80 E.g., Berthe´lemy 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009.
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will have fewer common interests when using trust funds to aid a MIC than when
using them for other purposes, such as aiding fragile states or financing provision of
global public goods. We can thus formulate our second hypothesis:
H5. A donor prefers to channel its support for middle-income countries through
small trust funds as opposed to large trust funds.
Donors have full discretion in limiting a trust fund’s disbursements to countries that
are not eligible for IDA allocations. We construct the dummy variable “middle-
income country assistance” to capture such a restriction, based on IBRD/IDA eli-
gibility status as available from the trust fund database.81
Economic hardship in the donor country
An economic downturn in the donor country can lead to increased emphasis on the
use of aid for donor interests and specifically for commercial benefits, rather than for
development objectives broadly shared within the donor community. Particularly
when unemployment is relatively high in the donor country, combating poverty at
home will become more of a priority relative to combating poverty overseas. Parlia-
mentarians, voters and interest groups in the donor country may favor earmarking
aid more narrowly, so that it can potentially be delivered in ways that support job
creation or other commercial benefits to the donor country. In this context, a donor’s
preferences for earmarked aid are less likely to be aligned with those of other donors,
and may even conflict with them.82 This argument leads to our third hypothesis:
81 See World Bank 2014b. Many trust funds are not limited to specific countries, so a MIC-only
dummy is simpler than constructing a (continuous) income measure for a trust fund’s recipient
countries. Moreover, it arguably better reflects donor motives of aiding countries of particular
geopolitical or commercial importance that are ineligible for IDA. Note in using the term “middle-
income” as shorthand for “IDA non-eligible,” we are not referring to the World Bank’s income
classification system, which is separate from its lending categories.
82 Interview with Lead Operations Officer, August 26, 2013.
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KLM If a given donor country faces increased unemployment, it will participate
more in small trust funds relative to large trust funds.
Unemployment rates (in percent) for all bilateral donors are taken from the World
Development Indicators (WDI).83
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Estimation strategy
Our theoretical focus is on the determinants of donor choices to join different types
of trust funds. Empirically, however, we ideally would want to estimate a fuller
model in which the donor country first allocates its aid budget between trust funds,
other bilateral aid, and core contributions to multilateral agencies, and then chooses
in which trust funds to participate (see Figure 4). The key advantage of such an
approach would be to account for potential unobserved confounders that introduce
correlated decisions.84
Unfortunately, this approach is infeasible due to the lack of common data struc-
tures in both stages. The first stage uses total amounts allocated to each general
aid type, whereas the second stage considers participation decisions of the donors in
various institutional arrangements that jointly define multi-bi aid. In addition, as
we are interested precisely in the determinants of donor participation in the various
trust funds, we would unduly sacrifice meaningful information if we aggregated all
donor participation decisions within a particular trust fund type.
Our empirical analysis therefore remains focused on the second stage. This
approach yields consistent estimates when all confounders are observable and con-
83 See World Bank 2014b. We considered other measures to capture economic hardship, for
example budget balance, inflation, growth, and output gap, which yield qualitatively comparable
results.
84 Heckman 1976.
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propensity of a donor to engage in trust funds largely depends on its available aid
budget. Moreover, even when there are unobservable factors for which we fail to
control, these factors do not affect the consistency of the differences in estimated
coefficients across equations, so long as they only affect the baseline probability
that a donor joins a trust fund. In other words, to produce inconsistent estimates a
potential confounder must affect the relative attractiveness of different fund types.
When unobservables introduce correlation between the first stage and the second
stage in the latter way, our approach may yield biased estimates. This is partic-
ularly likely in two cases. First, a potential trust fund of a particular type might
not be observed because the donor chose to allocate aid to one of the two tradi-
tional aid types. Second, a donor may perceive a fund to be less attractive because
some specific other donor is a member, which more generally reflects cross-sectional
dependence.
Based on qualitative evidence, we argue that the first bias is negligible. Staff
interviews suggest that confounders in this case are likely time-invariant, for example
because a certain type of donor prefers SDTFs for some unmeasurable reason.85 Such
a bias is eliminated when using fixed effects.
To mitigate the second bias, we present estimates based on two trust fund “choice
sets” that reflect different assumptions on the counterfactual. In line with the model,
all possible trust funds should be considered. However, information is available only
for trust funds that actually exist. To generate the full data set, we proceed with
two alternative assumptions leading to two choice sets. In choice set A, we assume
that within each group of trust funds (SDTFs, small MDTFs, and large MDTFs),
any fund that is used by at least one of the donors could have been chosen by any
85 SDTFs are known to be used by “emerging donors” that have not yet found their “comfort
zone,” whereas established donors are more reluctant to create SDTFs given their impact on
fragmentation (Interview with Trust Fund Coordinator, August 8, 2013).
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on a SDTF in any specific area, we assume that any other donor could have made
the same kind of arrangement. Similarly, if there is a MDTF in a given area, we
assume that those donors that do not participate in this fund would in principle
also have had the option to do so. In choice set B, we allow for any observed fund
to be counterfactually conceived as any of the other trust fund types: For all funds
that exist in the form of one particular fund type (as included in choice set A), the
two other fund types would also have been possible (choice set B). This implies, for
example, that a specific SDTF that the Netherlands used to channel money through
the World Bank could have been set up alternatively as a small MDTF or even a
large MDTF. This greatly increases the number of observations in the dataset by
adding further zeros for non-membership (since many of the potential funds never
came into existence in reality), and hence makes it unlikely that we miss out a
potential fund whose existence is related to some unobservable factor. Note that it
is not clear a priori which choice set is more plausible in practice.
We acknowledge that our inferences are based on observational data, and caution
should be exercised in interpreting our findings as causal. However, we apply conven-
tional remedies such as fixed effects in order to mitigate potential omitted-variable
bias.
5.2 Data
Having discussed the challenges related to the empirical analysis of our argument,
we describe the data structure and related estimation techniques in the following.
To test our hypotheses, we use a dataset of all World Bank Group trust funds
that received at least one contribution within fiscal years 2002-2013.86 The donors
86 See World Bank 2014b. Our dataset includes the full population of trust funds at the public-
sector branch (i.e., IBRD/IDA trust funds), and the private-sector branch (i.e., IFC trust funds)
of the World Bank Group. As mentioned earlier, the longest time span available to observe trust
fund participation decisions ranges from 2002 to 2013.
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membership and a range of key predictors are available.
The dependent variable is a binary indicator reflecting the participation of each
individual donor i in fund f .87 Trust funds were created in different years, and
the corresponding year effects can be controlled for, but note that we do not have
time-series cross-sectional panel data, as each fund is observed only once for each
donor.
We run the estimations separately for SDTFs, small MDTFs, and large MDTFs,
using robust linear probability models with standard errors clustered at the level
of donor countries. Given that each donor country faces a budget constraint that
implies that its participation in a number of funds may preclude participation in
another fund, we consider that the decisions are not taken independently of each
other. Possible correlations of errors across equations are taken into account using
seemingly unrelated estimation with unbalanced equations, a method that uses a
common variance-covariance matrix for the different regressions.88 The observation
numbers across equations are unbalanced because the World Bank managed far more
SDTFs than MDTFs over the 2002-2013 period. Robust estimation can flexibly
handle this lack of balance. To test our hypotheses, we conduct Wald tests to
compare coefficients across equations.
In the Supplemental Appendix, we also show a replication of the same regressions
for different definitions of small versus large MDTFs. Because the cutoff point is
somewhat arbitrary, we should be able to confirm that a small change will not
substantially affect our results. In addition to the cutoff between 4 and 5 donors
used so far, we present estimations for cutoffs between 6 and 7, and between 10 and
87 We also considered using contribution amounts for a robustness check, but the necessary data
are not available.
88 See Zellner 1962. We employ the suest routine for Stata to run these estimations (McDowell
2004). This approach also follows the standard guidance on the estimation of fixed-effects panel
data systems (Blackwell 2005).
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is already a relatively big step that tends to blur the distinction between the two
categories. The outcomes are generally in line with these expectations.
For each block of three regressions corresponding to the three categories of funds,
we use exactly the same specification. The first block includes only six variables cor-
responding to the six hypotheses listed above, without fixed effects or other controls.
The second block includes fixed effects for donor countries and for trust fund starting
years.89 The third block adds more controls, including variables related to bi- and
multilateral aid as alternative funding options to multi-bi aid as a whole. Moreover,
they include a variety of indicators capturing the (development-related and general)
know-how and capacity of the donor country. Such capacity should generally reduce
the need to use the multilateral channel, given the conventional wisdom that ex-
pertise and knowledge are key reasons for delegation to multilaterals.90 Finally, we
include a binary indicator variable for particularly contentious issues, as identified
from a small expert survey carried out within the World Bank.91 Creating a trust
fund pertaining to one of these issues allows donors to circumvent lengthy or divi-
sive debates within a multilateral’s decision-making body, where not only the big
traditional donors but also MICs have an influential voice. All variables and their
sources are described in more detail in Tables 5 and 6.
5.3 Findings
Tables 1 and 2 show the results for choice sets A and B respectively. As expected,
the larger the variation in ex-ante bilateral sectoral aid preferences, the lower is the
propensity of any donor to contribute to large MDTFs. This result is robust across
specifications. In Table 1, an increase in the coefficient of variation by one standard
89 A Hausman test indicates that random effects specifications would lead to inconsistent coef-
ficients.
90 Rodrik 1995.
91 World Bank 2013b.
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such a large fund, whether or not fixed effects or control variables are included. This
is a substantively meaningful effect.92 Wald tests (Table 3) confirm that differences
in the effects of ex-ante variation of sector focus on the likelihood of joining large-n
funds versus small-n funds (small MDTFs or SDTFs), are statistically significant.
Coefficients on ex-ante variation of sector focus are similarly signed and statis-
tically significant in Table 2. Coefficient magnitudes appear to be much smaller,
however, due to the much larger number of “0” observations in choice set B. For
large MDTFs, the dataset size increases tenfold, with the addition of numerous ob-
servations for potential funds that did not come into existence. This addition reduces
the baseline probability for being a member of any of these multiple potential funds
to about one tenth of its initial value. A similar reduction in coefficient magnitudes
is a normal consequence of this reduction in the mean of the dependent variable,
and thus consistent with the results of Table 1. In fact, a one standard-deviation
increase in ex-ante variation of sector focus reduces the participation probability in
large-n MDTFs by 25 percent in relation to the baseline probability.93 As shown by
Table 4, Wald tests again confirm the distinctiveness of large-n funds as compared
to small-n funds.
Prior pledges at the G8 should reflect a common interest of at least some donors
in certain sectors. As expected, this variable is associated with increased participa-
tion in (small or large) MDTFs as opposed to SDTFs; for the latter, the coefficient
is always negative but in most cases insignificant. Results for the G8 variable are
statistically significant more often for choice set B than for A. This pattern can also
be seen from the corresponding Wald tests (Table 4), which indicate positive and
92 The baseline probability that any donor joins a large-n MDTF is 32 percent. The estimated
reduction in the probability for a one standard-deviation increase in ex-ante variation of sector
focus (sd = 0.26) is 4 percentage points, which in relative terms is 13 percent.
93 For a standard-deviation increase in ex-ante variation of sector focus (sd = 0.26), the likelihood
of participation in large-n MDTFs falls by 0.7 percentage points. This equals a relative change of
25%.
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to large MDTFs. One representative from a large donor explained that “[f]or polit-
ical reasons, it is difficult to decline participation in high-level multi-donor funds,”
citing the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) and the Middle
East and North Africa Trust Fund as two such examples.94
An even more robust relationship is observed between global activities and trust
fund participation. In line with our hypotheses, no matter the specification and
the choice set considered, trust funds supporting global activities tend to include
multiple donors. The probability of participating in a large MDTF increases by more
than 32 percent in choice set A (and doubles relative to the baseline probability in
choice set B) if it funds global activities. This effect is significantly larger than the
corresponding effect on small MDTFs funds (between 4 and 6 percent in choice set
A; between 20 and 24 percent in choice set B), which is in turn significantly higher
than for SDTFs (negative coefficients, not significantly different from zero). All
differences across trust fund types are strongly significant, as shown by Wald tests
in Tables 3 and 4.
In our interviews, donor officials explicitly mentioned climate change as a global
challenge that would require their cooperation, preferably through MDTFs.95 One
staff member speculated that trust funds enabled donors to show progress in climate
change.96
Results are also strong for trust funds with a focus on fragile states, which tend
to take the form of large MDTFs, consistent with the view that risk sharing is
an important consideration for these funds. For funds supporting fragile states, the
relative increase in the propensity to become a member is between 17 and 22 percent
in choice set A if it is a large MDTF, and about 80 percent in choice set B. According
94 Interview with Executive Director, August 22, 2013.
95 Interview with Executive Director, August 19, 2013, who mentioned climate change among
the top-3 issues for a multilateral effort, aside from gender inequality and fragile states.
96 Interview with Adviser, August 2, 2013.
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(Table 4). The significant difference in coefficients between small and large MDTFs
is consistent with the possibility that a subset of donors may have a disproportionate
interest in certain fragile states, where potential spillover effects are perceived to be
regional rather than global. However, the Wald test cannot establish a significant
difference between SDTFs and small MDTFs in choice set A (Table 3).
A large number of donors interviewed at the World Bank (including Australia,
Belgium, the European Commission, Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordics, and
the United Kingdom) said that they wished to see the World Bank doing more on
fragile states. World Bank staff also pointed to studies that pioneer MDTFs as a
useful instrument for post-conflict situations.97
The hypothesis that aid for middle-income countries tends to be motivated by
donor-specific interests – and should hence lead to the use of SDTFs rather than
MDTFs – is only partially supported. Results in Table 1 are mostly supportive,
but not those in Table 2 based on the larger choice set B. For this MIC-assistance
indicator, the outcome thus hinges on the beliefs about the more appropriate option
space for bilateral donors. If we believe that choice set A is more appropriate
(because, for instance, the multilateral agency might not be willing to host trust
funds of all types in all areas), then the results indicate that a large MDTF has a
(27 percent) lower probability of receiving contributions from any donor if it targets
MICs.98 In general, a focus on MICs tends to reduce the likelihood a fund receives
contributions, but this effect is significantly increased for large MDTFs. Wald tests
for choice set A show significant differences across all fund type comparisons except
between SDTFs and small MDTFs (Table 3). For choice set B, we cannot confirm
our hypothesis as all cross-equation coefficient differences are insignificant (Table 4).
97 Interview with Senior Operations Officer, July 23, 2013. For relevant policy papers, see Guder
(2009), Barakat (2009), and IEG (2011).
98 Again, we express the absolute change of 9 percentage points relative to the baseline probability
of 32 percent, which implies a relative change of 27 percent.
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that are highly sensitive to the inclusion of fixed effects and other controls. In the
very simple models without fixed effects or controls, these coefficients capture, to
a large extent, pure cross-sectional variation. Our hypothesis, however, is not re-
lated to the base level of unemployment (associated with structural problems of the
economy that cannot be addressed through aid), but to temporary downturns of
the economy that may lead donor country governments to use their foreign policies
to signal their concern for increasing employment. This reasoning is supported by
regressions that control for donor fixed effects. When the cross-sectional variation
is controlled for by the fixed effects (with or without additional controls), the coef-
ficients turn positive and partly significant in both choice sets for the smaller two
fund types. While this pattern of coefficients is consistent with our hypothesis, Wald
tests show that the differences between them are not always significant (Tables 3
and 4).
Qualitative evidence from staff interviews is consistent with these findings on
economic downturns. One staff member explained: “The financial crisis changed
things: There is more attention from bilateral constituencies [...] and more pressure
to account for aid money [...].”99 World Bank staff generally felt that donor countries
increased their tendency to earmark funds after the economic crisis.100
[Table 1 here]
[Table 2 here]
[Table 3 here]
[Table 4 here]
Overall, these tests mostly support our hypotheses. Results for ex-ante variation
of sector focus and the indicator variables for global activities and fragile states are
99 Interview with Trust Fund Coordinator in a regional unit, August 27, 2013.
100 Interviews with Executive Directors, August 21, 2013 and August 22, 2013, and a Program
Officer, August 14, 2013.
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do not turn out as strongly as expected. In reality, the type of fund chosen by a donor
does not always allow us to infer its actual motivation. On the one hand, donors
are sometimes bound by legal rules to channel their support to an SDTF even in a
multi-donor partnership. On the other hand, while individual donors cannot legally
earmark specific activities in MDTFs, they sometimes use “notional earmarking”
to indicate priority areas that the agency seeks to accommodate whenever possible.
Our data cannot tell whether any of these situations are present, but our qualitative
evidence suggests that they are rare. In statistical terms, these cases imply mea-
surement error in the respective fund category and attenuation bias on the related
coefficients, with differences across fund types tending to appear less significant. As
both of these sources of measurement error work against finding support for our
hypotheses, our coefficients can be seen as lower bounds on the true effect size.
Results for the control variables provide some support for the plausibility of the
overall specification. Donor wealth as measured by the log of GDP tends to be
associated with reduced participation in SDTFs but increased participation in both
small and large MDTFs. The coefficient on the log of bilateral aid tends to be
negative for the first two types of funds, but positive for large MDTFs, suggesting
that smaller trust funds may be closer substitutes for bilateral aid. The share of
multilateral aid in total aid is mostly insignificant.
The coefficient estimate for the share of administrative costs (as a percentage of
bilateral aid) is negative and sometimes significant for small funds, in contrast to
large MDTFs where it is positive. A higher administrative cost share may imply
greater capacity (in terms of staff and expertise) for the donor, reducing the need to
delegate administrative tasks such as concrete project identification and monitoring
to the multilateral agency. However, donors with greater capacity may be more
willing and able to exercise influence over multilateral agencies through trust funds.
Neither of these potential effects, one positive and the other negative, appears to
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We also control for a specific measure of donor expertise or intellectual leadership,
namely service by the donor as a chair or co-chair of DAC working parties related
to the topic of the fund. As expected, such a role within the DAC is positively
related to participation in large MDTFs, although the coefficient is significant only
in choice set A. Two broader proxies for capacity do not show any clear relationship
with trust fund participation. The number of researchers per 100 workers, and the
log of total expenditures on research and development, have opposing effects when
included together, and neither is significant when only one of them is included (lat-
ter result not shown in tables). A subjective measure of quality of the government
bureaucracy in the donor country (from the International Country Risk Guide) is
also insignificant. These are admittedly rough proxies: they do not specifically mea-
sure research on development and aid, or bureaucratic quality for the government’s
aid agencies.
Our final control variable that identifies particularly contentious issues within
the World Bank does not show the expected positive effect on multi-bi aid in gen-
eral. The coefficient for the contentious issues indicator is generally insignificant for
MDTFs, and positive (and marginally significant) in the SDTF regressions in choice
set B. These findings suggest that these topics may be contentious not only among
World Bank members as a whole, but also among donors. The contentious issue
variable may then be acting as, in effect, a second indicator of ex-ante heterogeneity
of donor interests, supplementing the main indicator that is based on bilateral sector
allocations.
Our main findings from regressions with fewer control variables are robust to
including this larger set of controls. They are also unaffected by using different
101 Although the aid variables including administrative costs are lagged, they are likely endoge-
nous (relaying on trust funds may reduce administrative costs), so we include them only as control
variables in robustness tests, and caution against over-interpreting their estimated coefficients.
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estimations, to account for the binary nature of the dependent variable. In these
tests, the direction and significance of all effects of interest were virtually unaf-
fected.102
Overall, these results are consistent with our general argument that a given donor
faces a trade-off between burden-sharing and preference homogeneity when choosing
the institutional channel for addressing development challenges, i.e., smaller versus
larger trust funds. This trade-off is affected by a range of variables that capture spe-
cific characteristics of issue areas and the donor country itself. We obtain strongest
support for our argument from variables relating to ex-ante variation of sector focus
as well as to global activities and fragile states.
6 Conclusion
Over the past two decades, donor countries have dramatically expanded their re-
liance on trust funds in their delivery of official development assistance. Trust funds
are ad-hoc international institutions that enable individual donors to bypass the
formal governing procedures at international development organizations while us-
ing the implementing capacities of these organizations to deliver aid earmarked for
particular sectors, themes and/or countries.
Unlike traditional bilateral aid, trust funds allow donors to benefit from country,
sector, or thematic expertise of the international organization hosting the fund.
Trust funds have the added advantages of reduced politicization and – in the case
of MDTFs – burden-sharing benefits. Compared to multilateral contributions, trust
funds benefit from greater donor control with respect to their activities and their
duration – trust funds can expire when they achieve their purposes or when donor
interests change, e.g., due to a change in government.
102 Results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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tional setups – from single-donor trust funds that are close substitutes to bilateral
aid to large multi-donor trust funds that in a few instances have evolved into sepa-
rate multilateral agencies. This instrument considerably increases the options from
which bilateral donors can choose for channeling their aid. We focus on the trade-offs
governing the choices among the various types of trust funds. We argue that a given
donor faces a trade-off between burden-sharing benefits in funds with many donors
and individual control in funds with fewer donors. Key implications of our theoreti-
cal model are that individual donor choices vary with external conditions regarding
the (thematic and geographic) area of intervention and the economic situation in
the donor country.
Based on a seemingly unrelated regression analysis of the World Bank’s trust
fund database over the last decade, we find that the donor’s willingness to opt for
(large) multi-donor trust funds is positively associated with ex-ante sector align-
ment among all donors as well as indicators for global activities and fragile states
assistance (for which the gains from burden-sharing are more likely to outweigh the
potential loss in control). Donors prefer single-donor trust funds when and where
national (e.g., commercial or geopolitical) interests tend to predominate (e.g., aid
to middle-income countries, and when unemployment rates are increasing). While
they could use bilateral aid for the same purpose, channeling funds through multilat-
eral agencies lets them benefit from the agency’s expertise and reduce administrative
cost, particularly in areas where their own capacity is limited. While our rough prox-
ies for donor capacity generally were not significant in our tests, capacity (along with
other donor-specific effects) differences are controlled for by the donor fixed effects
included in some of our specifications.
We believe that our analysis of donor choices among different trust funds is the-
oretically relevant. Trust funds are a new form of international institution that is
more flexible than full-fledged international organizations but that is not informal.
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– a trend that also is pervasive in other areas such as international trade.103 Trust
funds have lower sunk costs than international organizations, as they are easy to cre-
ate and easy to end when they served their purpose or when underlying preferences
change, which reduces the likelihood of “zombie organizations.”104 Also, trust funds
provide more choice in terms of combining the traditional benefits of bilateral and
multilateral aid. Hence, the proliferation of trust funds may be an efficient mecha-
nism for varying coalitions of donors to cooperate when their interests converge on
particular development issues at a particular moment in time. Nonetheless, trust
funds still involve transaction costs, and there is potential for further reforms to re-
duce fragmentation, i.e., through consolidating smaller funds with similar objectives.
For these reforms to be successful, however, it is important that the determinants
underlying the choice of the various trust funds are better understood.
Our data and methodology are not designed to test hypotheses about why donors’
use of trust funds has increased so much in recent years. However, our arguments
and evidence can suggest some answers. First, our interviews of donor officials
and staff indicate that budget constraints following the financial crisis have played
a role. By funneling their bilateral aid through the World Bank, they can “get
more money out the door with fewer staff.” Second, climate change and other
cross-border challenges have increased interest among donors in working through
MDTFs. As noted in some of our interviews, the country-based aid model of IDA is
far from ideal for providing aid in global public goods. Moreover, preferences among
the World Bank’s board members are not fully aligned in supporting some public
goods, such as climate change. Third, as more countries graduate from IDA, there
are more MICs that certain donors will want to continue aiding, with trust funds
103 See, e.g., Kahler (1992) and Foreman and Segaar (2006). For trade-related studies, see, e.g.,
Mansfield and Milner (1999) and Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003).
104 Gray 2015.
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as the relative influence (both formal and informal) of traditional donor countries
in the World Bank gradually – albeit slowly – declines, trust funds become a more
important means of bypassing the Bank’s governance systems, including the need
to obtain consensus on aid priorities.
The main theoretical insight of our paper applies to international development
organizations more generally. In deciding to join an international organization, a
key variable for any donor to consider is the number of other donors: the more
donors there are, for any given distribution of policy preferences, the greater are
the burden-sharing benefits, but the greater are the costs in terms of the loss of
control (with respect to activities and duration). A single-donor trust funds is at
one extreme, while a large multi-donor trust fund with essentially all possible donors
is at the other extreme. In analogy to trust funds, this trade-off should apply in the
creation of any international development organization. But there is a rather limited
number of international development organizations.105 Some of them were created
a long time ago, and most donors are members of most of them. Therefore, it would
be difficult to construct a dataset of international development organizations with
much variation in their size in order to test our hypotheses. The rise of trust funds
hence presents an ideal opportunity to test institutional design conjectures.106
105 Schneider and Tobin (2016) only have twelve organizations in their sample, and Milner and
Tingley (2013) are limited to focus on the discrete choice between bilateral aid and multilateral
aid.
106 Abbott and Snidal 1998; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal
2013.
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Figure 1: Top 25 recipient countries of country-specific trust funds
¼½¾¿ÀÁ Blue bars show the total number of contributions to any trust fund by any donor that
benefited the respective recipient over the period from FY 2002-13.
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Figure 4: Individual donor decision among general aid types
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SDTF MDTF≤ 4 MDTF≥5 SDTF MDTF≤ 4 MDTF≥5 SDTF MDTF≤ 4 MDTF≥5
Ex-ante variation of sector focus -0.005 -0.0003 -0.159*** -0.003 -0.011 -0.159*** -0.004 -0.002 -0.171***
(0.005) (0.017) (0.042) (0.006) (0.017) (0.040) (0.007) (0.020) (0.043)
Number of G8 summit pledges -0.002 0.011** 0.0002 -0.002 0.005 0.024** -0.003 0.003 0.017
(0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.002) (0.006) (0.012) (0.003) (0.007) (0.013)
Global activity -0.005* 0.014 0.105*** -0.005* 0.019** 0.112*** -0.008** 0.023** 0.125***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.018) (0.003) (0.009) (0.017) (0.004) (0.010) (0.019)
Fragile state assistance -0.007** -0.006 0.055*** -0.008** -0.005 0.072*** -0.009** 0.002 0.068***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.019) (0.003) (0.010) (0.019) (0.004) (0.011) (0.022)
Middle-income country assistance -0.001 -0.005 -0.088*** -0.001 -0.004 -0.087*** 0.001 -0.008 -0.090***
(0.003) (0.010) (0.019) (0.003) (0.010) (0.019) (0.003) (0.011) (0.021)
Unemployment rate -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.016*** 0.005 0.045** -0.017 0.009 0.040** -0.013
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.019) (0.033) (0.007) (0.021) (0.048)
Logarithm of GDP -0.005 0.045 0.219
(0.046) (0.180) (0.317)
Logarithm of bilateral aid -0.015 -0.104 0.134
(0.025) (0.081) (0.147)
Multilateral aid (% of total aid) -0.038 0.382 -0.700
(0.185) (0.549) (1.227)
Administrative costs (% of bilateral aid) -0.011 -0.035* 0.061
(0.007) (0.019) (0.068)
Researcher density -0.006** 0.023** -0.027
(0.003) (0.010) (0.019)
Logarithm of R&D expenditure 0.091*** -0.115 0.248*
(0.020) (0.070) (0.132)
Government quality -0.042 -0.198 -0.340
(0.055) (0.220) (0.366)
DAC (co)chair -0.005 -0.005 0.068**
(0.005) (0.016) (0.032)
Contentious issue 0.003 0.019 -0.001
(0.004) (0.014) (0.026)
Donor fixed effects no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 23075 5007 3101 23075 5007 3101 18195 4067 2624
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.45 0.10 0.19 0.46
Percent correctly predicted positives 77.4 73.1 65.3 83.3 80.6 79.9 87.5 85.3 81.3
Percent correctly predicted negatives 40.7 42.3 51.4 59.8 62.6 60.0 43.7 48.5 51.1
Cutoff 0.034 0.083 0.324 0.034 0.083 0.324 0.034 0.083 0.324
Robust standard errors clustered on donors in parentheses. Significance levels: *.1 **.05 ***.01
Cutoffs represent the unconditional means of the dependent variable for each fund type.
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SDTF MDTF≤ 4 MDTF≥5 SDTF MDTF≤ 4 MDTF≥5 SDTF MDTF≤ 4 MDTF≥5
Ex-ante variation of sector focus -0.004 0.004 -0.028*** -0.004 0.002 -0.023*** -0.005 0.002 -0.024***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Number of G8 summit pledges -0.003** 0.004*** 0.007*** -0.002 0.003** 0.007*** -0.003 0.002 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Global activity -0.010*** 0.007*** 0.058*** -0.009*** 0.006*** 0.059*** -0.011*** 0.006*** 0.065***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Fragile state assistance -0.009*** 0.005*** 0.023*** -0.008*** 0.004** 0.023*** -0.009*** 0.007*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Middle-income country assistance -0.002 0.0002 0.005** -0.002 0.001 0.005* -0.001 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Unemployment rate -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.003 0.007** -0.001 0.006 0.009** -0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Logarithm of GDP -0.007 0.019 0.006
(0.035) (0.026) (0.040)
Logarithm of bilateral aid -0.012 -0.014 0.031
(0.018) (0.014) (0.021)
Multilateral aid (% of total aid) -0.039 0.129 -0.081
(0.134) (0.100) (0.151)
Administrative costs (% of bilateral aid) -0.009* -0.007* 0.010*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Researcher density -0.006*** 0.005*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Logarithm of R&D expenditure 0.081*** -0.036*** 0.021
(0.015) (0.011) (0.017)
Government quality -0.023 -0.041 -0.005
(0.042) (0.031) (0.048)
DAC (co)chair -0.004 -0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Contentious issue 0.005* -0.002 -0.005
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Donor fixed effects no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 31183 31183 31183 31183 31183 31183 24886 24886 24886
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.07
Percent correctly predicted positives 81.7 74.2 51.0 83.5 87.5 71.9 87.9 90.4 77.5
Percent correctly predicted negatives 39.6 39.0 55.2 60.3 50.0 48.0 45.0 38.6 36.9
Cutoff 0.025 0.013 0.031 0.025 0.013 0.031 0.025 0.013 0.031
Robust standard errors clustered on donors in parentheses. Significance levels: *.1 **.05 ***.01
Cutoffs represent the unconditional means of the dependent variable for each fund type.
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(1) SDTF SDTF MDTF≤4 SDTF SDTF MDTF≤4 SDTF SDTF MDTF≤4
(2) MDTF≤ 4 MDTF≥5 MDTF≥5 MDTF≤ 4 MDTF≥5 MDTF≥5 MDTF≤ 4 MDTF≥5 MDTF≥5
Ex-ante variation of sector focus + -0.005 0.154*** 0.159*** 0.008 0.155*** 0.148*** -0.002 0.167*** 0.169***
Number of G8 summit pledges - -0.013*** -0.003 0.011 -0.007 -0.026*** -0.019* -0.006 -0.020** -0.014
Global activity - -0.019** -0.110*** -0.091*** -0.024** -0.117*** -0.093*** -0.030*** -0.132*** -0.102***
Fragile state assistance - -0.001 -0.063*** -0.061*** -0.003 -0.080*** -0.077*** -0.011 -0.076*** -0.066***
Middle-income country assistance + 0.044 0.087*** 0.083*** 0.027 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.009 0.091*** 0.082***
Unemployment rate + 0.005** 0.011 0.006 -0.040 0.021 0.061** -0.031 0.221 0.053*
Note: For each variable shown in the first column, cell entries show the difference in coefficients across equations indicated by the column
headers (β(1) − β(2) for any coefficient β), along with the significance of a one-sided t-test (expected direction of effect shown to the right of
each variable).
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(1) SDTF SDTF MDTF≤4 SDTF SDTF MDTF≤4 SDTF SDTF MDTF≤4
(2) MDTF≤ 4 MDTF≥5 MDTF≥5 MDTF≤ 4 MDTF≥5 MDTF≥5 MDTF≤ 4 MDTF≥5 MDTF≥5
Ex-ante variation of sector focus + -0.009 0.023*** 0.032*** -0.006 0.019*** 0.025*** -0.008 0.018*** 0.026***
Number of G8 summit pledges - -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.003** -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.005** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.006**
Global activity - -0.016*** -0.067*** -0.051*** -0.015*** -0.068*** -0.053*** -0.017*** -0.076*** -0.060***
Fragile state assistance - -0.014** -0.032*** -0.018*** -0.013** -0.032*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.031*** -0.015***
Middle-income country assistance + -0.002 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001
Unemployment rate + -0.002 -0.002 -0.0003 -0.003 0.005 0.008 -0.002 0.009* 0.011
Note: For each variable shown in the first column, cell entries show the difference in coefficients across equations indicated by the column
headers (β(1) − β(2) for any coefficient β), along with the significance of a one-sided t-test (expected direction of effect shown to the right of
each variable).
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count mean sd min max
1 if ccode is donor to TF 52416 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
1 if ccode is donor to SDTF 52416 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
1 if ccode is donor to MDTF≤ 4 52416 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00
1 if ccode is donor to MDTF> 5 52416 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
Ex-ante variation of sector focus 49080 0.84 0.26 0.42 2.67
G8 summit pledges 49800 0.40 0.68 0.00 5.00
Global activity 52416 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Fragile state assistance 49800 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
Middle-income country assistance 49800 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
Donor unemployment rate 50188 7.04 2.98 1.54 20.50
Log(GDP) 43406 26.92 1.56 22.58 30.24
Log(bilateral aid) 52367 21.37 1.59 16.81 24.20
Multilateral aid share 52367 0.31 0.13 0.07 0.85
Administrative cost share 52349 6.02 1.75 0.00 13.61
Researcher density 46482 7.52 2.89 1.35 17.25
Log(R&D expenditure) 46806 22.82 1.67 17.70 26.65
ICRG Index 47255 0.86 0.12 0.47 1.00
(Co-)chair at DAC 52416 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Contested issue 49800 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
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Dependent variable 
Participation decision 1 whether the donor ccode indeed was a donor to 
trust fund with identifier trustee over FY02-FY13 
(World Bank 2014b) 
Categorical variables 
Single-donor trust fund 
(SDTF) 
Exactly one participating donor (sovereign donor 
with a positive vote share in the Board); this is a 
behavioral definition, not a legal definition, as a 
single donor could set up a trust fund using the legal 
instrument of a MDTF; the discrepancy is 
empirically irrelevant; as above, any contribution 
over FY02 and FY13 will be considered (World Bank 
2014b) 
Small multi-donor trust fund 
(MDTF≤4) 
More than one sovereign donor participating in the 
fund, but at most four donors; participation requires 
at least one positive contribution over FY02-FY13 
(World Bank 2014b) 
Large multi-donor trust fund 
(MDTF5) 
More than four sovereign donors participating in the 
fund (World Bank 2014b) 
Main predictors 
Ex-ante variation of sector 
focus 
Coefficient of variation in donor preferences in the 
sectors underlying the trust fund over the three years 
before its establishment; donor preferences are given 
by sector shares in bilateral aid, using data from 
OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System (2014b). 
Formally, the measure computes as follows: 
For S sectors of a TF, obtain the relative shares si 
(i=1, ..., n). Compute the standard deviation σs of 
the series {si} and divide by its mean µ. Take the 
n
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heterogeneity measure. 
Number of sectors with G8 
summit pledges 
Number of sectors of the trust fund in which the 
international community made a pledge at the G8 
summit in the year before activation of the TF 
(hand-coding available upon request) 
Global activity Trust fund supports global activities; variable 
countrygrouping in the original data set; non-global 
activities are country-specific activities and regional 
activities (World Bank 2014a) 
Fragile state assistance Trust fund supports fragile state; variable fragileflag 
in the original data set (World Bank 2014a) 
Middle-income country 
assistance 
A trust fund is considered to support middle-income 
countries if its designated set of potenti  
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funding) (World Bank 2014a) 
Unemployment rate Donor unemployment rate (%) in the three years 
before activation of the trust fund (OECD 2014a) 
Control variables 
Logarithm of GDP Gross Domestic Product (GDP), logarithm of 
constant billion USD value, PPP and output 
approach, in the three-year period prior to TF 
creation (OECD 2014a) 
Logarithm of bilateral aid Bilateral aid in the three-year period prior to TF 
creation (using constant million USD values reported 
in DAC1) (OECD 2014b) 
Multilateral aid (% of total 
aid) 
Multilateral aid in % of total ODA in the three-year 
period prior to TF creation OECD 2014b, DAC1 
table) 
Administrative costs (% of 
bilateral aid) 
Administrative costs share in % of bilateral aid in the 
three-year period prior to TF creation (OECD 2014b, 
©ª
«¬­® ¯°±²³´
Researcher density Researcher density: Number of researchers per 100 
full-time employees, in the three years prior to TF 
creation (OECD 2014a) 
Logarithm of R&D 
expenditure 
Gross domestic R&D expenditure (both private and 
public), logarithm of constant USD value, in the 
three-year period prior to TF creation (OECD 2014a)
µ¶·³¸¹º³¹¯ »¼°²½¯¾ ¿­Àµ ½¹Á³Â ¶¹ ±¼¸³°¼Ã¸°¯½Ã »¼°²½
ty of donor country 
(Teorell et al. 2013) 
DAC (co)chair Whether donor held a (co)chair in the relevant 
OECD/DAC working group in the three years before 
establishment of the trust fund; relevant working 
groups are related to the sector underlying the trust 
fund (e.g., chairmanship in the Peace and 
Governance Working Group was only coded for trust 
fund assisting fragile states) (hand-coding available 
on request) 
Contentious issue At least one match in the titles of any of the projects 
under the fund search string: “hydropower”, “rain 
forest” and “Brazil”, “privatization” and “school” (or 
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and themes deemed to be contentious (i.e., 
hydropower, privatization, anti-terrorism and money 
laundering); expert survey item was considered 
contentious if it was judged relative more contentious 
than not (World Bank 2013b) 
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